

REMARKS

Applicants thank the Examiner for the very thorough consideration given the present application.

Claims 1-3, 5-7 and 9-11 are now present in this application. Claims 1, 7 and 10 are independent.

Reconsideration of this application, as amended, is respectfully requested.

Priority Under 35 U.S.C. § 119

Applicants thank the Examiner for acknowledging Applicants' claim for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119, and receipt of the certified priority document.

Rejection Under 35 U.S.C. § 102

Claims 1-2, 7-10 and 12 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by U.S. Patent 5,496,262 to Johnson et al. ("Johnson '262"). This rejection is respectfully traversed.

A complete discussion of the Examiner's rejection is set forth in the Office Action, and is not being repeated here.

Initially, Applicants note that this rejection is moot with respect to claims 8 and 12, which have been canceled.

During patent examination, the PTO bears the initial burden of presenting a *prima facie* case of unpatentability. *In re Oetiker*, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445, 24 USPQ2d 1443, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1992); *In re Piasecki*, 745 F.2d 1468, 1472, 223 USPQ 785, 788 (Fed. Cir. 1984). This burden

can be satisfied when the PTO presents evidence, by means of some teaching, suggestion or inference either in the applied prior art or generally available knowledge, that would have appeared to have suggested the claimed subject matter to a person of ordinary skill in the art or would have motivated a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine the applied references in the proposed manner to arrive at the claimed invention. See Carella v. Starlight Archery Pro Line Co., 804 F.2d 135, 140, 231 USPQ 644, 647 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 293, 227 USPQ 657, 664 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1017 (1986); In re Rinehart, 531 F.2d 1048, 1051-1052, 189 USPQ 143, 147 (CCPA 1976).

If the PTO fails to meet this burden, then the Applicant is entitled to the patent. However, when a *prima facie* case is made, the burden shifts to the Applicant to come forward with evidence and/or argument supporting patentability. Patentability *vel non* is then determined on the entirety of the record, by a preponderance of evidence and weight of argument, *Id.*

A prior art reference anticipates the subject matter of a claim when that reference discloses every feature of the claimed invention, either explicitly or inherently. In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1477, 44 USPQ2d 1429, 1431 (Fed. Cir. 1997) and Hazani v. Int'l. Trade Comm'n, 126 F.3d 1473, 1477, 44 USPQ2d 1358, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1997). While, of course, it is possible that it is inherent in the operation of the prior art device that a particular element operates as theorized by the Examiner, inherence may not be established by probabilities or possibilities. In re Oelrich, 666 F.2d 578, 581, 212 USPQ 323, 326 (CCPA 1981) and In re Rijckaert, 9 F.3d 1531, 1534, 28 USPQ2d 1955, 1957 (Fed. Cir. 1993).

Claim 1, as amended, recites a combination of features, including an inflatable bladder having volume-reducing internal component means for dissipating the flow of fluid into the bladder with accompanying reduction in fluid flow rates and noise generated by the fluid flow during pressurization of the bladder in a timed sequence of pressure hold and pressure release.

Johnson '262 does not disclose this claimed combination of features. While Johnson '262 does include two urethane foam layers 34, Johnson '262, in col. 2, lines 30-40, discloses those urethane foam layers in the context of U.S. Patent 4,628,945 ("Johnson '945"). Johnson '945 discloses urethane foam layers in the context of an inflatable device that is filled up with air by mouth (see the paragraph bridging cols. 2 and 3) and discloses that these layers are used as protective cushions to avoid discomfort to the wearer (see col. 4, lines 37-50).

There is no explicit disclosure in either Johnson '262 or Johnson '945 of an inflatable bladder having a volume-reducing internal component means for dissipating the flow of fluid into the bladder with accompanying reduction in fluid flow rates and noise generated by the fluid flow during pressurization of the bladder in a timed sequence of pressure hold and pressure release, as claimed.

Nor does the Office Action make out a *prima facie* case of inherent disclosure of the claimed invention. As pointed out in the case law cited above, for the office to show inherent disclosure, what is inherent must not just possibly occur, and must not just probably occur, but must necessarily occur. The Office Action clearly provides no objective factual evidence that the layers 32 of urethane foam in Johnson '262 necessarily constitute volume-reducing internal component means for dissipating the flow of fluid into the bladder with accompanying reduction

in fluid flow rates and noise generated by the fluid flow during pressurization of the bladder in a timed sequence of pressure hold and pressure release, as claimed, especially where the primary disclosed purpose of those urethane layers 32 is for the comfort of the wearer.

In response to these arguments, the outstanding Office Action states starting on page 4, that “Johnson ‘262 doesn’t disclose the a volume-reducing internal component is used for dissipating the flow of fluid into the bladder with accompanying reduction in fluid flow rates and noise generated by the fluid flow during pressurization of the bladder in a time sequence of pressure hold and pressure release.”

Applicant respectfully submit that this admission dooms the rejection and conclusively establishes that the outstanding Office Action does not make out a *prima facie* case of anticipation of the claimed invention by Johnson ‘262.

The Office Action continues by asserting that “Johnson ‘262 does not have to disclose that the volume-reduction internal component is used to perform the same function as the volume-reduction internal component as disclosed in the present invention. Johnson ‘262 simply has to disclose a volume-reduction internal component that is capable of performing the same function.”

Applicants respectfully disagree with this statement and note that the Office Action completely fails to cite any legal support for this assertion. In this regard, Applicants respectfully submit that all words in a claim must be considered in judging the patentability of that claim against the prior art. In re Wilson, 424 F.2d 1382, 1385, 165 USPQ 494, 496 (CCPA 1970).

Moreover, Applicants respectfully submit that the Office Action fails to present any objective factual evidence that Johnson's '262 device is even capable of performing the recited function. In this regard, Applicants' device differs significantly from Johnson's '262 device in that Johnson '262 employs four separate inflatable chambers 8, 9, 10 and 11 with a urethane foam layer in only two of these four chambers, i.e., in chambers 8 and 9. No urethane foam layer is provided in either inflatable chamber 10 or inflatable chamber 11. Moreover, air is pumped into Johnson's '262 device via coupling 4, which is in chamber 10, which does not contain a urethane foam layer. In other words, col. 5, lines 30-65 of Johnson '262 clearly indicates that the intermittent flow of pressurizing fluid is only fed to the two internal chambers 10 and 11 of bladder 6, neither of these chambers having a volume reducing component. The internal foam components 34 in Johnson '262 are located in internal chambers 8 and 9, which are orally inflated through a self-sealing valve 9a (see col. 5, lines 37-38 of Johnson '262). Chambers 8 and 9 are not fed with intermittently pulsed fluid from the air pump. This differs significantly from Applicants' device, in which an inflatable chamber is provided, and in which the air coupling 8 is located in a sidewall of that chamber, and wherein that chamber includes the insert.

In other words, Johnson's '262 structure differs so substantially from that of Applicants that it is not reasonable to conclude that the bladder structure disclosed by Johnson '262 would even be capable of dissipating the flow of fluid into the bladder with accompanying reduction in fluid flow rates and noise generated by the fluid flow during pressurization of the bladder in a timed sequence of pressure hold and pressure release, as claimed.

The inclusion of foam material in Johnson '262 is never mentioned as being operatively coupled to Johnson's '262 pulsed pressure chambers 10 and 11, and therefore appears to be used to merely provide a cushioning effect for the limb of a wearer when the device is in use. Certainly such a disclosure does not constitute objective factual evidence of Johnson's '262 cushioning material 34 as being directed to reducing fluid flow rates and noise of pulsed air that is not in contact with that cushioning material 34.

Moreover, the real test of patentability is whether Johnson '262 discloses the claimed invention explicitly or inherently, i.e., necessarily, and Johnson '262 admittedly does not contain such a disclosure.

Even the assertion that Johnson '262 is capable of performing the claimed invention is based solely on speculation, and not objective factual evidence, as required by the aforementioned case law.

With respect to independent claim 7, this claim positively recites a combination of features including a flexible pad having an inflatable interior filled or partially filled with a cellular component providing means for reducing fluid flow rates and noise during pulsed pressurization of said inflatable interior of the flexible pad.

Applicants respectfully submit that the arguments presented above directed to the subject matter of claim 1 apply equally to claim 7, there being no explicit or inherent disclosure in Johnson '262 of a flexible pad having an inflatable interior filled or partially filled with a cellular component providing means for reducing fluid flow rates and noise during pulsed pressurization of said inflatable interior of the flexible pad. The concept of using such a pad for reducing fluid

flow rates and noise reduction during in a timed sequence of pressure hold and pressure release regarding the inflatable interior of the flexible pad is completely absent from Johnson '262.

With respect to independent claim 10, this claim positively recites a combination of features including a flexible pad having an inflatable chamber having means for controlling fluid flow rates and noise level during pressurization of the inflatable chamber by varying the internal volume of the inflatable chamber.

Applicants respectfully submit that the arguments presented above directed to the subject matter of claim 1 apply equally to claim 10, there being no explicit or inherent disclosure in Johnson '262 of a flexible pad having an inflatable chamber having means for controlling fluid flow rates and noise during pressurization of the inflatable chamber by varying the internal volume of the inflatable chamber. The concept of using such a pad for reducing fluid flow rates and noise reduction during pressurization which is applied in a timed sequence of pressure hold and pressure release is completely absent from Johnson '262, explicitly and inherently (i.e., necessarily).

Accordingly, the Office Action fails to make out a *prima facie* case of anticipation of the invention recited in claims 1-2, 7-10 and 12.

Reconsideration and withdrawal of this rejection of claims 1-2, 7-10 and 12 are respectfully requested.

Rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 103

Claims 3 and 11 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Johnson '262 in view of U.S. Patent 4,135,500 to Gorran. This rejection is respectfully traversed.

A complete discussion of the Examiner's rejection is set forth in the Office Action, and is not being repeated here.

Because the rejection is based on 35 U.S.C. § 103, what is in issue in such a rejection is "the invention as a whole", not just a few features of the claimed invention. Under 35 U.S.C. § 103, "[a] patent may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains." The determination under section 103 is whether the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made. See In re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 902, 7 USPQ2d 1673, 1680 (Fed. Cir. 1988). In determining obviousness, the Examiner must explain what the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are and provide objective factual evidence to support a conclusion that it would be obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to achieve the claimed invention, which includes those missing features.

In the second place, in rejecting claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103, it is incumbent on the Examiner to establish a factual basis to support the legal conclusion of obviousness. See, In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1073, 5 USPQ2d 1596, 1598 (Fed. Cir. 1988). In so doing, the Examiner is

expected to make the factual determinations set forth in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17, 148 USPQ 459, 467 (1966), and to provide a reason why one of ordinary skill in the pertinent art would have been led to modify the prior art or to combine prior art references to arrive at the claimed invention. Such reason must stem from some teaching, suggestion or implication in the prior art as a whole or knowledge generally available to one having ordinary skill in the art. Uniroyal, Inc. v. F-Wiley Corp., 837 F.2d 1044, 1051, 5 USPQ2d 1434, 1438 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 825 (1988); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 293, 227 USPQ 657, 664 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1017 (1986); ACS Hospital Systems, Inc. v. Montefiore Hospital, 732 F.2d 1572, 1577, 221 USPQ 929, 933 (Fed. Cir. 1984). These showings by the Examiner are an essential part of complying with the burden of presenting a *prima facie* case of obviousness. Note, In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445, 24 USPQ2d 1443, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The mere fact that the prior art may be modified in the manner suggested by the Examiner does not make the modification obvious unless the prior art suggested the desirability of the modification. In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1266, 23 USPQ2d 1780, 1783-84 (Fed. Cir. 1992). To establish *prima facie* obviousness of a claimed invention, all the claim limitations must be suggested or taught by the prior art. In re Royka, 490 F.2d 981, 180 USPQ 580 (CCPA 1970). All words in a claim must be considered in judging the patentability of that claim against the prior art. In re Wilson, 424 F.2d 1382, 1385, 165 USPQ 494, 496 (CCPA 1970).

A showing of a suggestion, teaching, or motivation to combine the prior art references is an “essential evidentiary component of an obviousness holding.” C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys.,

Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1352, 48 USPQ2d 1225, 1232 (Fed. Cir. 1998). This showing must be clear and particular, and broad conclusory statements about the teaching of multiple references, standing alone, are not “evidence.” See *In re Dembiczak*, 175 F.3d 994 at 1000, 50 USPQ2d 1614 at 1617 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

Moreover, it is well settled that the Office must provide objective evidence of the basis used in a prior art rejection. A factual inquiry whether to modify a reference must be based on objective evidence of record, not merely conclusory statements of the Examiner. See, *In re Lee*, 277 F.3d 1338, 1343, 61 USPQ2d 1430, 1433 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

Furthermore, during patent examination, the PTO bears the initial burden of presenting a *prima facie* case of unpatentability. *In re Oetiker*, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445, 24 USPQ2d 1443, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1992); *In re Piasecki*, 745 F.2d 1468, 1472, 223 USPQ 785, 788 (Fed. Cir. 1984). If the PTO fails to meet this burden, then the Applicant is entitled to the patent. Only when a *prima facie* case is made, the burden shifts to the Applicant to come forward to rebut such a case.

Applicants respectfully submit that Johnson ‘262 does not anticipate the subject matter of claim 1 from which claim 3 depends, or claim 10 from which claim 11 depends, so even if one of ordinary skill in the art were properly motivated to modify Johnson ‘262 in view of Gorran (which is not the case for reasons explained, below), as suggested, the resulting modified version of Johnson ‘262 would not suggest or render obvious the claimed invention.

Moreover, the Office Action fails to provide any objective factual evidence that one of ordinary skill in the art would be properly motivated to turn to Gorran to modify Johnson ‘262 for a number of reasons.

Firstly, Johnson '262 and Gorran are quite different and are not concerned with solving the same problem. Johnson '262 is concerned with an intermittently pressurized multicomponent cuff for therapeutic treatment of human body parts, where the cuff includes urethane layers inside the cuff for comfort of a wearer of the therapeutic cuff, whereas Gorran is concerned with an air mattress flotation support system 10 that rests on, not inside of, an air bladder, and is raised up and down by the air in the air bladder.

Secondly, the Office Action fails to provide objective factual evidence that replacing urethane foam layers 34 by a gel inside of the Johnson '262 cuff will achieve the patient cushioning and compression provided by a urethane foam layer, especially since the gel in Gorran is freely dispersible throughout the element 10 of Gorran.

In response to these arguments, the outstanding Office Action argues that "the gel and the foam are equivalent when it comes to reducing the internal volume of an inflatable bladder." In response, Applicants respectfully submit that just because something is an equivalent, does not mean that one of ordinary skill in the art would be properly motivated to turn to Gorran to modify Johnson '262, especially here, where Johnson '262 and Gorran are quite different and are not concerned with solving the same problem. Johnson '262 is concerned with an intermittently pressurized multicomponent cuff for therapeutic treatment of human body parts, where the cuff includes urethane layers inside the cuff for comfort of a wearer of the therapeutic cuff, whereas Gorran is concerned with an air mattress flotation support system 10 that rests on, not inside of, an air bladder, and is raised up and down by the air in the air bladder.

Moreover, the test set forth in this rejection to support obviousness, i.e., “the gel and the foam are equivalents,” is not a proper test for obviousness, but is part of a doctrine of equivalents test used to show infringement of a patent claim, and is known as the “function, way, result” test. See, in this regard, for example, Network Commerce, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 76 USPQ2d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Just because something is a functional equivalent does not mean that it is an obvious equivalent, especially when what is at issue is the claimed combination, of features that neither reference alone suggests.

Furthermore, neither reference discloses reducing noise during pulsed/intermittent inflation of a bladder using the claimed volume-reducing internal component means for dissipating the flow of fluid into the bladder.

The Office Action also states that any object that is soft could be substituted for the gel or foam in order to occupy space inside the bladder. However, the claimed invention is not directed to any object that can fit inside of a bladder and take up space.

Accordingly, the Office Action fails to make out a *prima facie* case of obviousness of the claimed invention.

Reconsideration and withdrawal of this rejection of claims 3 and 11 are respectfully requested.

Claims 4-5 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over “Johnson ‘262 in view of Johnson ‘262.” This rejection is respectfully traversed.

Initially, Applicants note that this rejection is unclear to the point that it is not capable of being understood. The statement of the rejection is based on a base reference in view of a secondary reference, but identifies the same reference as the base reference and the secondary reference. Moreover, the body of the rejection does not further clarify the basis for the rejection, either, as it merely discusses "Johnson '262." As such, the rejection is fatally flawed and must be withdrawn.

Clarification is respectfully requested.

In response to this request for clarification, the Office Action simply repeats the rejection, only identifying Fig. 3 as "a different embodiment." Unfortunately, this rejection is still not clear because (1) the first embodiment is said to be "figures 1-6" and the second embodiment is said to be "figure 3," which is part and parcel of figures 1-6. Moreover, element 10 is clearly shown in Figures 2, 3, 5 and 6.

In other words, Applicants respectfully submit that the outstanding Office Action still does not explain how Figure 3 differs from itself and all other figures, and what aspect of the other figures is supposed to be modified by Figure 3.

Also, the outstanding Office Action still fails to provide objective factual evidence of proper motivation for one of ordinary skill in the art to modify the primary reference (Figures 1-6) in view of the secondary reference (Figure 3). The alleged reason for motivation a skilled worker to modify Figures 1-6 is Johnson '262 is "because either internal component could be used to reduce volume within the inflatable bladder." Unfortunately, this is just a statement of what could happen and fails to address motivation for making it happen.

Another way of responding to this rejection is to state that Johnson '262 discloses two embodiments, each having a plurality of inflatable bladders. The preferred embodiment, shown in Figures 2 and 3, has three inflatable bladders, 9, 10 and 11. The second embodiment, shown in Figures 5 and 6 has four inflatable bladders, 9, 10, 10a and 11. Neither of these embodiments is said to have a bladder with a foam attached to a wall of a bladder. All that is stated is that sealed chamber 8 of Figure 3 enclosed within chamber 9 has a layer of urethane foam 34 therein, and that another layer of urethane foam is placed in chamber 9 between the chamber 8 and the chamber 11. So, Johnson '262 clearly does not disclose a layer of foam attached to a bladder wall, as claimed. Because of this, no matter how Johnson's '262 embodiments are modified in view of one another, they cannot render the claimed invention obvious.

With respect to the issue of proper motivation, the Office Action merely concludes that either component (without identifying both components) could be used to reduce volume in an inflatable bladder. This is nothing more than a broad conclusory statement about the teaching of multiple references that does not constitute evidence of proper motivation - see the "Dembiczak" case, cited above.

Furthermore, as discussed above, all of Johnson's '262 embodiments are totally devoid of disclosing the inclusion of foam material as being operatively coupled to Johnson's '262 pulsed pressure chambers, and the only use of cushioning material 34 does not constitute objective factual evidence of Johnson's '262 cushioning material 34 as being directed to reducing fluid flow rates and noise of pulsed air that is not in contact with that cushioning material 34.

Under the circumstances, Applicants respectfully submit that the Office Action fails to make out a *prima facie* case of obviousness of claims 4-5.

Reconsideration and withdrawal of this rejection of claims 4-5 are respectfully requested.

Claim 6 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable “over the references as applied to claims above, and further in view of Grim ‘525.” This rejection is respectfully traversed.

Because claim 6 depends from claim 5 and because the rejection of claim 5 is so unclear that it is also not capable of being understood, this rejection is also not capable of being understood. As such, the rejection is fatally flawed and must be withdrawn.

Clarification is respectfully requested.

Turning to the merits of the rejection, Applicants respectfully incorporate herein the reasons from the traversal of the aforementioned rejection of claims 4 and 5, above.

Furthermore, the Office Action fails to provide any objective factual evidence that one of ordinary skill in the art would be properly motivated to turn to Grim to modify the only identified single one of two references on which this rejection is based, because Johnson ‘262 and Grim are so different (a rapidly constantly inflated and deflated therapeutic cuff and an infrequently inflatable shoe) and are not concerned with solving the same problem. Johnson ‘262 is concerned with an intermittently pressurized multicomponent cuff for therapeutic treatment of human body parts, where the cuff includes urethane layers inside the cuff for comfort of a wearer

of the therapeutic cuff, whereas Grim is concerned with an athletic shoe that does simply not have the intermittent pressurization and de-pressurization aspect Johnson '262.

Instead of responding to the merits of this argument, the outstanding Office Action sidesteps it by stating that "Grim was used as a modifier to provide a teaching of having channels in a foam pad." The problem with this response is that it evidences the fact that this rejection merely picks and chooses different pieces of different references and combines them without any objective factual evidence of proper motivation to do so, and, instead, using only Applicants' disclosure as a blueprint to do so, which is evidence that this rejection is based solely on improper hindsight reconstruction of the claimed invention. One "cannot use hindsight reconstruction to pick and choose among isolated disclosures in the prior art to deprecate the claimed invention." In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1075, 5 USPQ2d 1780, 1783 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Case law makes clear that the best defense against hindsight-based obviousness analysis is the rigorous application of the requirement for a showing of a teaching or motivation to combine the prior art references. See Dembiczak, 175 F.3d at 999, 50 USPQ2d at 1617. "Combining prior art references without evidence of such a suggestion, teaching, or motivation simply takes the inventor's disclosure as a blueprint for piecing together the prior art to defeat patentability—the essence of hindsight." *Id.*

Furthermore, one of ordinary skill in the art would have no motivation to include a foam material, grooved or not, in Johnson's '262 intermittently pulsed bladders because Johnson '262 clearly does not disclose such a feature.

Under the circumstances, Applicants respectfully submit that the Office Action fails to make out a *prima facie* case of obviousness of claim 6.

Reconsideration and withdrawal of this rejection of claim 6 are respectfully requested.

Premature Final Rejection

Applicants continue to respectfully submit that the outstanding Office Actions should not have been made final because of the unclear nature of the previous rejection of claims 4 and 5. Moreover, the outstanding Office Action still is unclear with respect to the rejection of claim 5, for reasons set forth in detail, above. The Office Action still does not clearly explain what aspect of Figures 1-3 is modified by Figure 3's element 10, when the figures that show both disclosed embodiments contain element 10.

Conclusion

All of the stated grounds of rejection have been properly traversed, accommodated, or rendered moot. Applicants therefore respectfully request that the Examiner reconsider all presently outstanding rejections and that they be withdrawn. It is believed that a full and complete response has been made to the outstanding Office Action, and as such, the present application is in condition for allowance.

Applicants also note that because the rejection of claim 5 is completely unclear to the point of not being comprehensible enough to fully respond to on their merits, it must be withdrawn and any further rejections of claim 5 cannot properly be made final.

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If the Examiner believes, for any reason, that personal communication will expedite prosecution of this application, the Examiner is invited to telephone Robert J. Webster, Jr., Registration No. 46,472, at (703) 205-8000, in the Washington, D.C. area.

Prompt and favorable consideration of this Amendment is respectfully requested.


If necessary, the Commissioner is hereby authorized in this, concurrent, and future replies, to charge payment or credit any overpayment to Deposit Account No. 02-2448 for any additional fees required under 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.16 or 1.17; particularly, extension of time fees.

Date: **MAY 30 2007**

Respectfully submitted,

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